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COURT OF APPRALS, 1955 TERM
plaintiff's tax returns. The plaintiff failed to produce the records claiming that
they had been lost in the fire, and also refused to permit examination of its tax
returns. The insured did produce a document which was purported to be the
original of an inventory taken a few weeks before the fire. During the examina-
tion the plaintiff withdrew its $20,000 claim for "out-of-sight" damages and
demanded an appraisal, but the insurer refused to take part.
Although the Court of Appeals has indicated that a forfeiture may
result if the insured refuses to participate in an appraisal demanded by the
insurer,36 it is settled in New York that the Court will not force the insurer to
join in the appraisal.3 Relying on this, the Court affirmed a dismissal of the
plaintiff's first cause of action.
The Court then found that the Appellate Division erred in granting the
defendant's motion for summary judgment. A motion for summary judgment
dismissing the complaint on affidavits may be made in an action for a sum of
money arising on an express contract.38 As pointed out by Judge Cardozo, to
award this relief, however, "the court must be convinced that the issue is not
genuine, but feigned, and that there is in truth nothing to be tried."3 9 Thus, sum-
mary judgment has been denied where the question depended upon the intent
of the parties to a contract4" and where an ambiguity in a contract existed.
4
'
In reaching its decision in the instant case the Court felt that the question of
whether or not there was a wilful and fraudulent withholding of information is the
kind of question of fact which should be resolved at a trial.
In a case of this nature it is difficult to say that the facts dearly show that the
insured has failed to comply with the terms of the policy. It therefore seems to be
the better result, that before the insured should forfeit his entire daim-the net
effect of granting defendant's motion-he should have the facts determined at a
trial.
Conflict of Interest Between Company and Assured
The right to a declaratory judgment depends on there being a present
36. Matter of Delwar Box Co. (Aetna Ins. Co.), 309 N. Y. 60, 65, 127 N. E. 2d
808, 811 (1955).
37. Matter of Delrmwr Box Co. (Aetna Ins. Co.), supra, note 36. The agree-
ment as regards appraisal is distinguished from an agreement to submit to arbitra-
tion in Syracuse Say. Bank v. Yorkshire Ins. Co., 301 N. Y. 403, 94 N. E. 2d 73
(1950).
38. N. Y. R. Civ. PRAC. 113(4).
39. Curry v. Mackenzie, 239 N. Y. 267, 146 N. E. 375 (1925).
40. Piedmont Hotel Co. v. A. E. Nettleton Co., 263 N. Y. 25, 188 N. E. 145
(1933).
41. Utica Garting, Storage & Contracting Co. v. World Fire & Marine Ins. Co.
277 App. Div. 483, 100 N. Y. S. 2d 941 (4th Dep't 1950).
BUFFALO LAW REVIEW
justiciable controversy,42 with the presence of the parties before the court and an
inadequacy of other relief.43 Jurisdiction rests in the discretion of the court.
44
In Prashker v. U. S. Guarantee Co45 plaintiff sought to have the liability of
the insurance company declared concerning the assured's liability policy which
contained an exclusionary clause. Plaintiff's decedent was involved in an accident
and a cause of action was brought against the estate. The complaint contained
allegations some of which would be within, and some without the policy; the
Court refused to grant a declaratory judgment on the ground that no justiciable
controversy was presented, the question of liability being premature. The correct-
ness is obvious from the possible anomalous consequences which could result. A
determination of liability of the insurance company might be made in this declara-
tory judgment, holding that the decedents negligence was within the policy. But
in the main negligence trial, the estate could be held liable on a ground within
the exclusionary clause. A declaratory judgment is final;46 the Court's judgment
would be res judicata. As a result the Court might be rewriting the insurance
contract by holding the company liable or exonerating it contrary to stipulated
terms in the policy.
The most interesting question, however, concerned the Court's ruling that
due to this conflict of interest the plaintiff could select an attorney to represent
the decedents estate rather than have the insurance company represent the estate
in the main negligence action, the standard procedure as stated in most insurance
liability policies.47 The insurance company, the Court stated, would still be
responsible for the assured's attorney's fees.
The assured would naturally seek to avoid all liability but if held liable a
conflict of interest would arise. In that case the assured would want to have the
grounds of negligence fall within the policy, while the insurance company would
attempt to show that the assured's liability fell within the exclusionary clause.
Nothing in the Court's ruling implies, however, that the company cannot have
its own attorney at the trial to protect its own interests.
42. Reed v. Littleton, 249 App. Div. 310, 292 N. Y. Supp. 363 (2d Dep't 1936).
43. Post v. Metropolitan Casualty Ins. Co. of New York, 227 App. Dlv. 156,
237 N. Y. Supp 64 (4th Dep't. 1929), aff'd., 254 N. Y. 541, 173 N. E. 857 (1930);
N. Y. Civ. P Ac. AcT §473: The supreme court shall have power in any action ...
to declare rights and other legal relations on request for such declaration whether
or not further relief is or could be claimed, and such declaration shall have the
force of a final judgment ....
44. Bareham v. City of Rochester, 246 N. Y. 140, 158 N. E. (1927); N. Y. R.
CIV. PRoc. 212: If, in the opinion of the court, the parties should be left to relief
by existing forms of actions, or for other reasons, it may decline to pronounce a
declaratory judgment, stating the grounds on which its discretion is so exercised.
45. 1 N. Y. 2d 584, 136 N. E. 2d 871 (1956).
46. N. Y. Civ. PRAc. AcT §473.
47. No New York or foreign jurisdiction cases could be found where such
conflict of interest was resolved in this manner.
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In case liability should be determined the company could deny liability on
the ground that the negligence fell within the exclusionary clause. A special
verdict would solve this problem but if such a verdict were denied the basis of
liability would still have to be determined. The Court equitably and correctly
resolved the conflict of interests between the assured and the insurance company
by permitting the assured to select an attorncy to represent the deceased's estate
despite the fact that the terms of the policy may have been rewritten in part.
Third-Party Practice-Cooperation
Most automobile liability insurance policies contain a "cooperation clause." -4 8
In general, this provides that the insured shall cooperate with the company in
such matters as giving evidence, attending hearings, and in the conduct of suits.49
In American Surety Company of New York v. Diamond,50 the Court had to decide
whether the insured's refusal to verify a third-party complaint amounted to a
failure to meet the obligations of this clause.
The insured's father, a passenger, was fatally injured when the automobile
driven by the insured's mother was involved in a collision. The mother, as
executrix of her husband's estate, brought an action against the insured under a
theory of vicarious liability 5 -she was the permittee-driver. Claiming that the
insured had an action over against his active tort feasor, the Company requested
the insured to verify a third-party complaint5 2 against his mother. The insured
refused. He argued that it was not proper to make a claim against his mother who,
as driver of the car, was also insured under the same policy. The Company
declined to accept the insured's offer to submit this controversy to the Appellate
Division upon an agreed statement of facts 53 but commenced this action seeking
a declaratory judgment that it was not obligated to defend this action or to pay
any judgment which might be rendered against the insured.
In a 4-3 decision the Court reversed judgments 54 in the company's favor and
dismissed the complaint. Judge Desmond, writing for the majority, pointed out
that the purpose of the cooperation clause is to guarantee the insured's assistance
in the defense of claims;55 he stated that the Company only acquired the right
48. SAWYER, AUTOMOBILE LIABILITY INSURANCE 145 (1936).
49. Ibid.
50. 1 N. Y. 2d 594, 136 N. E. 2d 876 (1956).
51. N. Y. VEHICLE AND TRAFFIC LAW §59.
52. N. Y. Civ. PRAC. AcT §193(a) 1. After the service of his answer, a defend-
ant may bring in a person not a party to the action, who is or may be liable to
him for all or part of the plaintiff's claim against him, by serving as a third-
party plaintiff upon such person a summons and a copy of a verified complaint.
53. N. Y. CiV. PRAc. ACT §546.
54. Am. Sur. Co. of N. Y. v. Diamond, 206 Misc. 309, 133 N. Y. S. 2d 697 (Sup.
Ct. 1954), aff'd mem., 285 App. Div. 1138, 142 N. Y. S. 2d 364 (1st Dep't 1955).
55. See Wenig v. Glens Falls Indem. Co., 294 N. Y. 195, 61 N. E. 2d 442
(1945).
